Does Money Matter for the Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks: A DSGE Perspective. by Céline Poilly
Does Money Matter for the Identi￿cation of Monetary Policy
Shocks: A DSGE Perspective.1
CØline Poilly2
Banque de France, DGEI-DIR, Service de Recherche en Øconomie et ￿nance,
and University of Cergy-Pontoise￿ THEMA
September 15, 2007
1I am indebted to Julien Matheron and Patrick FŁve for valuable suggestions and for providing boot-
strap code implementing. I also thank Vladimir Borgy, Benjamin Carton, Fabrice Collard, Thibault
Guyon, Jean Guillaume Sahuc for helpful comments. This paper has bene￿ted from comments at the
Banque de France research seminar, the T2M confØrence 2007 and the 11th ZEI International Summer
School.
2Corresponding author. Banque de France, DGEI￿ DIR￿ RECFIN (41-1391), 31 Rue Croix des Petits
Champs, 75049 Paris cedex 01, France. Tel: +33 1 42 92 49 95, Fax: +33 1 42 92 62 92. Email:
celine.poilly@banque-france.fr.Abstract
This paper investigates how the identi￿cation assumptions of monetary policy shocks modify
the inference in a standard DSGE model. Considering SVAR models in which either the interest
rate is predetermined for money or these two monetary variables are simultaneously determined,
two DSGE models are estimated by Minimum Distance Estimation.
We emphasize that real balance e⁄ects are necessary to replicate the high persistence implied
by the simultaneity assumption. In addition, the estimated monetary policy rule is strongly
sensitive to the identi￿cation scheme. This suggests that the way to introduce money in the
identi￿cation scheme is not neutral for estimation of DSGE models.
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Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in developing Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models so as to deepen our knowledge of the transmission of monetary pol-
icy shocks. Following the contributions by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) and Christiano
et al. (2005), it has now become standard practice to confront DSGE models to the predictions
of monetary Structural Vector AutoRegressive (SVAR) models. In particular, an increasing list
of authors resort to the Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE), which consists of picking the
DSGE parameters to best reproduce the empirical impulse response functions drawn from the
monetary SVAR model1.
The implementation of the MDE methodology requires to impose identi￿cation restrictions on
the SVAR model so as to insulate the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks. Following Christiano
et al. (2005), most papers resort to the recursive identi￿cation strategy ￿namely the Cholesky
decomposition. It is usually assumed that certain private sector variables respond with a lag to
the monetary policy shock, usually depicted by an exogenous variation of the interest rate. On
the contrary, some informative variables are assumed to respond immediately after the shock.
As a consequence, when the interest rate and money are combined into a SVAR model, the
Cholesky decomposition requires to make a choice: is money predetermined for the interest rate
or not? If the answer is yes, the money demand is forced to be interest inelastic. This implies
that no direct role is assigned to money in the transmission of the shock. In the opposite case,
the interest rate cannot directly respond to monetary disturbances since it is assumed to be
inelastic to money supply.
Departing from this recursive identi￿cation strategy, Leeper and Roush (2003) freely estimate
1A non exhaustive list of contributions includes Amato and Laubach (2003), Trigari (2004), Altig et al. (2005),
Boivin and Giannoni (2006), H￿elsewig et al. (2006), Meier and M￿ller (2006), DiCecio and Nelson (2007), Carrillo
et al. (2007).
1the interest elasticities of supply and demand for money, implying that the interest rate and
money are now simultaneously determined. Under this assumption, their key ￿ndings are that
the degree of inertia exhibited by in￿ ation and the magnitude of output and consumption re-
sponses to the monetary policy shock rise. In addition, standard overidentifying restrictions
tests suggest that the data favor the simultaneity speci￿cation between the interest rate and
money rather than the Cholesky-type decomposition. Thus, the omission of this simultaneity in
the identi￿cation strategy might result in a misspeci￿cation of the SVAR model.
In light of these ￿ndings, one may legitimately wonder how inference about a DSGE model, esti-
mated by MDE, is changed when we resort to the non recursive identi￿cation strategy, proposed
by Leeper and Roush (2003), instead of the standard Cholesky decomposition, implemented in
the CEE-based model2. This is the question under study in this paper. Particularly, we ask
three questions: (i) Can the CEE-based model replicate the increased amount of persistence in
in￿ ation, without relying unreasonable degrees of nominal rigidity? (ii) What are the conse-
quences on the deep parameters of adopting a non recursive identi￿cation strategy in the SVAR
model? (iii) How does this identi￿cation strategy impact on the theoretical representation of
monetary policy?
To answer to these questions, we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we consider two SVAR models
which di⁄er in the restrictions imposed to identify the monetary policy shock. In a ￿rst spec-
i￿cation, we assume that all the macroeconomic variables are predetermined for the interest
rate, except money growth, which roughly corresponds to the Cholesky decomposition. In a
second speci￿cation, we follow Leeper and Roush (2003) by assuming that money growth and
the interest rate are simultaneously determined, which is to say that the interest elasticities of
2We mean by CEE-based model, the fully ￿ edged model proposed by Christiano, Einchenbaum and Evans
(2005). This framework has become a benchmark in the literature when it comes to understanding the e⁄ects
of monetary policy shocks. It features a set of frictions, namely habit formation, nominal rigidities on prices
and wages, investment adjustment costs and variable capital utilization in order to reproduce the persistence
properties of key macroeconomic variables.
2supply and demand for money are unconstrained. We estimate these quarterly SVAR models
on a set of U.S. variables over the sample 1959Q2-2004Q4.
Secondly, by using these two SVAR models, we estimate by MDE the structural parameters of
a standard CEE-based model. We consider two DSGE models since the theoretical and empir-
ical SVAR models must have identical timing restrictions and they also have to share similar
monetary policy speci￿cations. Especially, in the two theoretical models, the private sector vari-
ables are predetermined for the monetary policy shock. In addition, in each DSGE model, we
specify an interest rate rule which closely corresponds to the monetary policy representation of
the SVAR model3. Finally, we estimate the model￿ s parameters so as to minimize the distance
between the model-based and the SVAR-based impulse response functions.
Our results emphasize that a standard DSGE model, which embodies reasonable degrees of
rigidities, is able to replicate the stronger persistence implied by the simultaneity assumption
between the interest rate and money growth. In addition, we show that the estimated monetary
policy rule in the DSGE model is deeply changed by the identi￿cation scheme. Indeed, it
corresponds to the standard Taylor rule when we resort to the Cholesky decomposition. However,
as soon as we make the simultaneity assumption, the interest elasticity to money supply in the
monetary policy rule is high and signi￿cant. This paper also highlights that the real balance
e⁄ect helps to precisely estimate this relationship between the interest rate and money in the
monetary policy rule. Indeed, this e⁄ect can be viewed as an important monetary transmission
channel which modify money￿ s dynamics. Due to the simultaneity assumption, this e⁄ect on
money￿ s dynamics thereby impact on those of the interest rate. Finally, the taste parameters
and the degrees of nominal rigidities are not strongly changed by the identi￿cation scheme.
Consequently, we show that the way to insert money in the identi￿cation scheme is not neutral
3Precisely, the interest elasticity to money supply is estimated in the DSGE associated to the SVAR model
with the simultaneity assumption. It is constraint to zero in the Cholesky speci￿cation.
3on the inference about DSGE models when we are interested on the transmission of monetary
policy shocks.
The remainder is as follows. Section 1 expounds the SVAR models. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy. Section 4 discussed the estimation
results. The last section brie￿ y concludes.
1 Money in a SVAR model
In this ￿rst part, we estimate two empirical SVAR models by identifying monetary policy shocks
with a non recursive identi￿cation strategy. We compare two identi￿cation schemes, based on
the simultaneity (or not) between the interest rate and money growth, in order to state whether
the monetary aggregate provides information useful to identify monetary policy shocks. Firstly,
we introduce the estimation method and secondly, we describe the identi￿cation strategy and
the results.
1.1 Estimation Method
Before identifying the monetary policy shock in the SVAR model, we estimate the canonical
VAR(p) model4
xt = ￿1xt￿1 + ::: + ￿pxt￿p + "t; (1)
where xt is an (n ￿ 1) vector of data, p is the maximum lag and we assume that "t ￿ iid(0;￿),
where ￿ is a symmetric positive de￿nite matrix. We use U.S. quarterly data over the sample
4A detailed technical appendix is available upon request.
41959Q2-2004Q45. Let us de￿ne xt, the data vector
xt = (log(yt), log(it); log(ct), ￿w
t , ￿t, Rt, ￿log(mt), log(crbt))0; (2)
where yt is real output, it is real investment, ct is real consumption expenditures, ￿w
t is wage
in￿ ation, ￿t is in￿ ation, Rt is the Fed Fund rate, ￿log(mt) is the growth rate of M2 and crbt is
commodity prices6. The variables in the SVAR model have been selected so as to be consistent
with the theoretical model used in this paper. However, the main results concerning the empirical
impulse responses are not modi￿ed by this choice (Leeper and Roush, 2003). In addition, due to
the convergence issues related to the non recursive identi￿cation strategy, we limit the size of the
SVAR model. Consequently, we do not use as many variables as some authors who follow the
MDE approach (Altig et al., 2005 or Christiano et al., 2005, for instance). Finally, minimization
of Hannan-Quinn information criterion yields p = 4.
In order to identify monetary policy shocks, we require some identi￿cation restrictions. Following
Amisano and Giannini (1997), we can express the relation between the reduced form residuals,
"t, and the structural innovations, ￿t, using the linear combination
A"t = B￿t; (3)
where A and B are non singular matrices. We assume that diag(A) = 1 where 1 is a n
dimensional vector of ones and B is a diagonal matrix with diag(B) > 0. In addition, we
assume that the structural innovations are Normally distributed, such that ￿t ￿ N(0;In)7.
5In the technical appendix, we proceed to a subsample analysis. None of the results are a⁄ected by this one.
6The detailed description of the data sources and construction is provided in the appendix.
7As explained by Lutkep￿hl (2005), the Gaussian distribution is assumed for computational convenience.
Indeed, as usual, the FIML estimators will be consistent and asymptotically Normal without the Gaussian as-
sumption, as soon as the structural innovations are independent and identically distributed.
5We seek to identify the monetary policy shock by restricting parameters on matrices A and B,
the remaining free parameters having to be estimated. Following L￿tkepohl (2005), we stack
the free parameters of A and B in vectors denoted by ￿A and ￿B, respectively, and we estimate
these parameters by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) subject to the identi￿cation
restrictions. In addition, we ful￿l the order condition by imposing no more than n(n￿1)=2 free
parameters. Finally, we check the rank condition in order to guarantee global identi￿cation8.
Under local identi￿cation, L￿tkepohl (2005) shows that the FIML estimators ^ ￿A and ^ ￿B are
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.
1.2 Identi￿cation Strategy and Results
1.2.1 Identi￿cation of Monetary Policy Shocks
Leeper and Roush (2003) question the recursive identi￿cation strategy that is widely used in the
literature. Indeed, the Cholesky decomposition requires extreme assumptions about the interest
elasticities of money supply and money demand which in turn may imply a misspeci￿cation
of the SVAR model. Following these authors, we investigate whether identi￿cation restrictions
impact the responses of key macroeconomics variables, in order to highlight the contemporaneous
interactions between money growth and the interest rate. Table 1 describes the identi￿cation
restrictions on matrix A for the two speci￿cations9. In the ￿rst panel of table 1, the interest rate
is predetermined for money growth. In the second panel, the interest rate and money growth
are simultaneously determined.
Firstly, in each identi￿cation pattern, we assume that output, investment, consumption, wage
in￿ ation and in￿ ation respond only to their own contemporaneous disturbances. This speci￿ca-
8A complete description of global identi￿cation in SVAR models is proposed by Christiano et al. (1999).
9We focus here on identi￿cation restrictions on matrix A. Indeed we restrict matrix B such that it is a positive
diagonal matrix where the parameters of the diagonal are free parameters included in vector ￿B.
6tion means that these variables are determined one quarter before the realization of monetary
policy shocks. Secondly, following the literature, we use the commodity price index in order to
take additional information about future in￿ ation into account (Sims, 1992, Leeper and Roush,
2003). We assume that the commodity price index responds to contemporaneous disturbances
of all the variables. In doing so, we stress the informative nature of this variable which captures
economic news. Finally, the money demand function is expressed in its traditional form: the
monetary aggregate responds to contemporaneous disturbances of consumption, prices and the
interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest elasticity of money demand is ￿nite and
has to be estimated.
Finally, let us focus on the sixth line of matrix A which corresponds to the identi￿cation of
monetary policy shocks. Formally, we can identify monetary policy shocks with the disturbance
term in the following equation
Rt = f(￿t) + ￿R￿R
t ;
where ￿R￿R
t is a monetary policy shock, f(￿) is a linear function that represents the monetary
authority￿ s feedback rule and ￿t is the monetary authority￿ s information set10. In table 1, we
compare some identi￿cation schemes which di⁄er in terms of ￿t.
￿ The ￿rst panel of table 1 corresponds to scheme B: the interest rate, as well as the private
sector variables, are predetermined for money growth. In addition, we assume that the
interest rate responds to contemporaneous disturbances of output and in￿ ation. This
identi￿cation assumption is close to the Cholesky decomposition which is widely used in
the literature (Kim, 2000; Amato and Laubach, 2003; Christiano et al., 2005). In this case,
the interest elasticity of money supply is in￿nite, which might be viewed as an extreme
10Some authors also propose to measure the monetary policy instrument with non borrowed reserves (Eichen-
baum, 1992) or money base (Poole, 1970). However, following a large part of the literature, our monetary policy
rule features a short term interest rate as instrument (Clarida et al., 2000; Giannoni and Woodford, 2004).
7assumption, as argued by Leeper and Roush (2003).
￿ Contrary to the Cholesky-type identi￿cation, in the last panel of table 1, we assume that
the interest rate and money growth are simultaneously determined (scheme C). This means
that the interest elasticity of money supply has to be freely estimated and we assume that
the interest rate responds only to contemporaneous money growth disturbances. This si-
multaneity assumption has been used by Christiano et al. (1997), Leeper and Roush (2003)
and Sims and Zha (2006). Its advantage is that it o⁄ers the possibility of distinguishing
money demand disturbances from monetary policy shocks through the interest elasticities
of money demand and money supply.
1.2.2 Comparison of the Impulse Response Functions
Figures 1 reports the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs), over 20 quarters, of the key variables
in xt, to an exogenous increase in the interest rate which corresponds to a monetary contraction
in each scheme11. The overall pattern of the IRFs is not greatly altered by a change in identi￿-
cation priors. However, the di⁄erence between the two schemes is mainly re￿ ected in the extra
persistence and the magnitude of the impulse responses. Indeed, as soon as the interest rate and
money growth are simultaneously determined, the recession is deeper. However, unlike Leeper
and Roush (2003), the reduction of the price puzzle is not so clear12. The magnitude of the
response of the wage in￿ ation is also altered by the identi￿cation scheme. Indeed, its response is
stronger and much more persistent when we assume simultaneity but its size is smaller compared
with the other variables. In addition, the impact response of the interest rate is smaller in scheme
C and its IRF is much more persistent. Finally, we can point out that the impact response of
11The con￿dence intervals of these IRFs are given in ￿gures 2 and 3.
12This di⁄erence may results from the data construction (Leeper and Roush, 2003, use the price level rather
than in￿ ation) and the data frequency (they use monthly data rather than quarterly data).
8money growth is stronger when we assume simultaneity between the interest rate and money
growth13. These di⁄erences in the IRFs of the interest rate and money growth highlight the key
role of the identi￿cation assumptions of monetary policy shocks14.
These results con￿rm that the degree of inertia exhibited by in￿ ation increases and the magni-
tude of output, consumption and investment responses to a monetary policy shock rises when
we depart from the restrictions made in the Cholesky decomposition15. Therefore, we will inves-
tigate in the next section whether a CEE-based model is able to replicate this stronger degree
of persistence without relying unreasonable degrees of nominal rigidity. In addition, we will
highlight how the estimation of deep parameters and the monetary policy representation are
modi￿ed with respect to the identi￿cation assumptions made in the SVAR model.
2 The Theoretical Model
In this section, we describe the theoretical model based on Christiano et al. (2005)16. We
build a framework in which the timing of events is consistent with the previous identi￿cation
schemes. This means that all the optimization decisions of households and ￿rms are made before
the realization of the monetary policy shock, except households￿decisions concerning asset and
money holdings which are made at the same period. This speci￿cation implies that production,
investment, consumption, prices and wages decisions are predetermined for monetary variables.
13This result is also con￿rmed by Smets (2003) on euro area data.
14These SVAR models are not just identi￿ed. We thus report overidentifying restrictions tests (LR tests and
Schwarz criterion minimization) in the technical appendix. We obtain similar results than Leeper and Roush
(2003): scheme C is favored by the data, compared to scheme B.
15In the technical appendix, we provide an interesting result: omitting money in a SVAR model identi￿ed
with the Cholesky decomposition is not harmful. Indeed, the empirical IRFs obtained in scheme B are very close
to those obtained if we exclude money from the SVAR model. This means that the inclusion of money in the
empirical model has a very small e⁄ect on the variables￿dynamics if we assume a recursive decomposition.
16We present here the loglinear version of the model. The details are provided in the appendix and the calcu-
lations are given in the technical appendix available upon request.
92.1 Production Side and Price Setting
In the ￿rst sector, the ￿nal good dt is produced in a competitive market by combining a contin-
uum of intermediate goods indexed by & 2 [0;1]. In addition, we use two assumptions which are
known to increase the degree of strategic complementarities between price-setting ￿rms. Firstly,
we assume that the aggregate demand for ￿nal good is decomposed between a consumption good
(yt) and a material good (xt), which both are produced by combining the same intermediate
goods, and which have the same nominal price Pt. Secondly, the ￿nal good is produced through
a production function characterized by a variable elasticity (Kimball, 1995).
In the second sector, monopolistic ￿rms￿ & produce the intermediate goods & 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm
& is the sole producer of intermediate good &. We assume that monopolist & uses labor (nt(&)),
capital (kt(&)) and material goods (xt(&)) as inputs in order to produce dt (&). In addition,
following Calvo (1983), we assume that in each period of time, a monopolistic ￿rm can reoptimize
its price with probability 1￿￿p, irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised its price. If
the ￿rm cannot reoptimize its price, the latter is completely indexed to past in￿ ation.
Standard manipulations yields the loglinearized new Phillips curve
^ ￿t ￿ ^ ￿t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ ￿￿p)
￿p(1 + ￿p￿￿)
Et￿1f^ stg + ￿Et￿1 f^ ￿t+1 ￿ ^ ￿tg; (4)
where ^ ￿t is the logdeviation of gross in￿ ation, ￿t, around its steady state, ^ st is the logdeviation
of the real marginal cost, st
17. In addition, ￿p is the steady state elasticity of demand for a
producer of intermediate good and ￿￿ is the elasticity of time varying markup ￿p (dt (&)=dt),
evaluated at the steady state. Finally, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor.
The aggregation of inputs is de￿ned by
R 1
0 nt(&)d& = ‘t, and
R 1
0 kt(&)d& = utkt, where ut is the
17Afterwards, we denote ^ xt as the logdeviation of xt, around its steady state, where xt is a variable of the
model.
10utilization rate of capital. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we assume for convenience, that
capital accumulation and utilization decisions are made by households. The loglinearized version
of the real marginal cost can be expressed as
(1 ￿ ￿psx) ^ wt = ^ st + ￿(1 ￿ ￿psx)(^ kt + ^ ut ￿ ^ ‘t); (5)
(1 ￿ ￿psx)^ rk
t = ^ st + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿psx)(^ kt + ^ ut ￿ ^ ‘t); (6)
where ￿p is the steady state price markup, sx is the share of material goods in gross output and
0 < ￿ < 1 is the elasticity of value added with respect to capital. Finally, wt is the real wage
and rk
t is the real rental rate of physical capital.
2.2 Households￿Decisions
The economy is inhabited by di⁄erentiated households indexed by ￿ 2 [0;1], each of which is
endowed with a speci￿c labor type. The typical household ￿ seeks to maximize his lifetime utility
subject to the budget constraint and the law of capital accumulation18. Solving the household￿ s
optimization program yields the following behavioral equations expressed in their loglinearized
version.
Firstly, the risk free bond equation is given by
^ ￿t ￿ ^ Rt = Etf^ ￿t+1 ￿ ^ ￿t+1g; (7)
where ^ ￿t is marginal utility of wealth and ^ Rt is the gross nominal interest rate of the economy.
18The detailed optimization program is provided in the appendix.
11Secondly, the loglinearized version of consumption behavior is given by
Et￿1f(1 ￿ ￿b)￿^ ￿tg = Et￿1f￿b^ ct+1 ￿ (1 + ￿b2)^ ct + b^ ct￿1 + ￿(^ mt ￿ ￿b^ mt+1)g; (8)
where ^ ct is the household￿ s consumption, ^ mt denotes real cash balances and b 2 (0;1) is the
consumption habit parameter. Let ￿ denote the curvature of the utility function with respect
to ct. In addition, ￿ measures the real balance e⁄ects upon aggregate demand, such that




Here, Um and Uc denote the steady state value of the derivative of the utility function with
respect to the steady state of mt and ct, respectively. In our model, we assume that broad
monetary aggregate facilitates transactions which implies that real balances and consumption
expenditures are complement (Ucm > 0). Therefore, ￿ measures to what extent a change in real
money balances ￿caused for instance by a variation of the interest rate ￿a⁄ects household￿ s
consumption. Thereafter, this parameter will be essential to investigate the money￿ s role in the
monetary policy transmission.
Thirdly, the money demand condition is given by
^ mt = ￿c(^ ct ￿ b^ ct￿1) ￿ ￿R ^ Rt; (9)
where ￿c measures the consumption elasticity of money demand and ￿R measures the interest
semi-elasticity of money demand. In addition, we stand next to the satiation level of money,
12which implies that Um tends to zero and then the structural parameters are bound by




Fourthly, the Euler equation on capital is given by
Et￿1f^ ￿t+1 + [1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] ^ rk
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿^ pk;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿t ￿ ^ pk;tg = 0; (11)
where ^ pk;t can be interpreted as the shadow value of additional capital and ￿ is the depreciation
rate of capital.
Fifthly, the household￿ s capital utilization decision is given by
￿￿1
a Et￿1f^ rk
t g = Et￿1f^ utg; (12)
where ￿￿1
a is the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the rental rate of capital.
Finally, the evolution of investment is given by
Et￿1f(^ {t ￿^ {t￿1) ￿ ￿(^ {t+1 ￿^ {t) ￿ {￿1^ pk;tg = 0; (13)
where ^ {t is investment and {￿1 is the elasticity of investment with respect to current price of
installed capital.
Finally, the loglinearized version of the law of motion for capital is de￿ned by
^ kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)^ kt + ￿^ {t: (14)
132.3 Households￿Wage Setting
Now, we focus on type-￿ household￿ s labor supply decisions. Following Erceg et al. (2000), we
assume for convenience that a set of di⁄erentiated labor inputs, indexed by ￿, are aggregated
into a single labor index ‘t by competitive ￿rms, which will be referred to labor intermediaries in
the sequel. They produce the aggregate labor input according to a CES technology. It is assumed
that, at each point in time, only a fraction 1 ￿ ￿w of the households can set a new wage, which
will remain ￿xed until the next time period the household is drawn to reset its wage. The
remaining households completely index their wages on past in￿ ation. Standard manipulations
yield the loglinearized version of the wage setting equation
^ ￿w
t ￿ ^ ￿t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿w)(1 ￿ ￿￿w)
￿w(1 + !w￿w)
Et￿1f!w^ ‘t ￿ ^ ￿t ￿ ^ wtg + ￿Et￿1f^ ￿w
t+1 ￿ ^ ￿tg (15)
where ^ ￿w
t denotes wage in￿ ation, ￿w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two labor
types and !w is the elasticity of labor disutility.
2.4 Monetary Authorities
Until now, we build a timing of events for the standard DSGE framework which is consistent with
that assumed in the previous two SVAR models. However, these empirical models di⁄er with
regard to the assumed simultaneity between the interest rate and money growth. Consequently,
we consider two monetary policy representations in the DSGE model which are speci￿ed in order
to be consistent with the monetary policy speci￿cation of the associated SVAR model.
Firstly, let us consider a monetary policy rule on the form
^ Rt = ￿i ^ Rt￿1 + [(1 ￿ ￿i)a￿]^ ￿t + [(1 ￿ ￿i)ay]^ yt + ￿t; (16)
14where ￿t is a serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock such that ￿t ￿ iid(0;￿￿). In addition,
￿i measures the speed of adjustment of the interest rate to its steady state level and a￿ and
ay measure the sensitivity of the interest rate to current in￿ ation and output, respectively.
This Taylor rule corresponds to the identi￿cation assumption which has been made in scheme
B. Indeed, money demand decisions are made after observing the monetary policy shock and
the interest rate is money inelastic. Consequently, this DSGE model can be viewed as our
benchmark case. Indeed, the monetary policy shock has been identi￿ed with the usual Cholesky
decomposition and we estimate a standard DSGE model speci￿ed with the Taylor rule. In this
case, money can only have a role through the real balance e⁄ect since it does not appear in
the interest rate rule. If the real balance e⁄ects are negligible (￿ = 0) ￿as proposed by some
authors (Woodford, 2003; McCallum, 2001) ￿introducing money in the model only aims at
determining the quantity of money that the monetary authorities have to supply in order to
clear the monetary market.
Secondly, we assume an alternative monetary policy rule
^ Rt = ￿i ^ Rt￿1 + [(1 ￿ ￿i)am]￿^ mt + [(1 ￿ ￿i)a￿]^ ￿t￿1 + [(1 ￿ ￿i)ay]^ yt￿1 + ￿t: (17)
This reaction function is consistent with scheme C in the previous section. Particularly, money
and the interest rate are determined simultaneously since households make their money and
bonds acquisition at the same period than the monetary shock and the interest rate responds
to contemporaneous variation of money growth (￿^ mt) and lagged values of in￿ ation and pro-
duction. In doing so, we seek to deal with the potential misspeci￿cation of the empirical SVAR,
which could result from the extreme assumption that the elasticity of the interest rate to money
supply, am, is nil. As a result, parameters am, ￿R and ￿ ￿which are directly related to money
15supply and money demand ￿are essential components to measure the degree of simultaneity
between the interest rate and money growth and evaluate thereby to what extent money matters
on the overall dynamics of the economy.
2.5 Model￿ s Summary
The theoretical model can be summarized by equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (11), (12),
(13), (14), (15), the monetary policy rules (16) or (17), and equalities
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿]^ ct + ￿￿￿^ {t + [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]￿^ ut = [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ^ yt; (18)
(1 ￿ ￿psx)^ yt = ￿p(1 ￿ sx)[￿(^ ut + ^ kt) + (1 ￿ ￿)^ ‘t]; (19)
and ^ ￿w
t = ^ wt ￿ ^ wt￿1 + ^ ￿t.
3 Model￿ s Estimation
3.1 Calibration
We partition the model parameters into two groups. The ￿rst one collects the parameters
which we calibrate prior to estimation. These include parameters given by the data, as well as
parameters that cannot be separately identi￿ed. Let  c = (￿;￿;￿p;sx;￿￿;￿w;!w;￿;￿)
0 denote
the vector of calibrated parameters, whose values are reported in table 2. We choose ￿ = 0:99
as is conventional in the literature for models confronted with quarterly data. As usual in the
literature, we set the elasticity of output to capital to ￿ = 0:36. In addition, we calibrate
￿p, sx and ￿￿ since these parameters cannot be identi￿ed, if we seek to estimate the degree of
price rigidities, ￿p (equation (4)). We set ￿p = 11, implying a steady state markup charged
16by intermediate goods producers of 10%, as proposed by Leith and Malley (2005). In addition,
we set sx = 0:55 implying that ￿psx = 0:6, as suggested by Woodford (2003). Finally, we
set ￿￿ = 0:2 which implies that a 2% increase in relative prices results in a 24% decline in
demand. This level of convexity of the demand function is reasonable19. For the same reason
as previously, we calibrate ￿w, which cannot be identi￿ed if we estimate the degree of wage
rigidities, ￿w, in equation (15). Therefore, we set ￿w = 11, which is close to the value obtained
by Kim (2000). We set !w = 1, which implies a logarithmic disutility of labor. In addition, we
set the conventional value ￿ = 0:025 which implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital of
10%. Finally, we use actual data to calibrate the steady state value of money￿ s velocity, ￿, such
that ￿ = 1:15.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
The second set of model￿ s parameters is estimated by MDE. We denote  , the vector of estimated
parameters
  = (￿; ￿; ￿c; ￿R; ￿p; ￿w; b; ￿; ￿a; ￿i; ap; ay; am; ￿￿)
0 :
In the ￿rst section, we estimated di⁄erent SVAR models on output, investment, consumption,
wage in￿ ation, in￿ ation, the Fed Fund rate, money growth and commodity prices from 1959Q2
to 2004Q4. Let us recall that the vector of data, xt, is given by vector (2).
We compute the empirical (n ￿ 1) vector of dynamic responses of the variables to a monetary






19A complete discussion about the curvature of the demand function is proposed in Chari et al. (2000) and
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).
20Since the commodity prices variable, crbt, doesn￿ t have any counterpart in the DSGE model, this variable is
removed from xt for the MDE procedure.
17and we de￿ne ￿, such that
￿ = vec(￿0;:::;￿h);
where the vec(￿) operator transforms an (n ￿ m) matrix into an (nm ￿ 1) vector by stacking
the columns of the original matrix and h is the ￿nal horizon. In our case, recall that h = 20
quarters21. Let ^ ￿T denote the empirical estimate of ￿, resulting from the estimated SVAR
model and T is the sample size. As shown in L￿tkepohl (2005)
p
T(^ ￿T ￿ ￿)
d ￿! N(0;￿￿);
where ￿￿ depends on the VAR parameters and matrices ^ A and ^ B. In a second step, we compute
the theoretical counterparts of vector ￿, denoted by ￿m( c; ), computed from the theoretical
system which has been solved with the AIM algorithm (Anderson and Moore, 1985). Finally,
we search for estimated values of  , denoted by ^  T, which ful￿l
^  T = argmin
 2￿
[￿m( c; ) ￿ ^ ￿T]0WT[￿m( c; ) ￿ ^ ￿T]; (20)
where WT is a diagonal matrix with the inverse of the asymptotic variances of each element of
^ ￿T along the diagonal. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we compute the standard errors of
the estimated parameters by using the asymptotic delta function method applied to the ￿rst
order condition associated with (20).
21Since some variables are predetermined for monetary policy shocks, the corresponding lines are zero in vector
￿0. Thus, we remove these lines from vector ￿ before estimation.
184 Simultaneity between Money and the Interest Rate: Some
Results
In the ￿rst section, we showed that simultaneity between the interest rate and money growth
changes the magnitude and the persistence of the empirical responses of key variables. The pur-
pose of this section is to investigate whether the standard CEE-based model is able to replicate
these features and how the inference about the DSGE model is a⁄ected by the identi￿cation
assumptions of the monetary policy shock.
4.1 Comparison of Empirical and Theoretical IRF
Figures 2 and 3 plot model-based and SVAR-based impulse responses, as well as the 90% as-
ymptotic con￿dence intervals of the latter, when the SVAR model is identi￿ed with schemes B
and C, respectively22. The comparison of the empirical and theoretical IRFs aims to assess the
models￿ability to replicate the main features of the economy after a monetary contraction23.
In ￿gure 2, the interest rate is predetermined for money growth (scheme B). In this case, the
responses of output, investment, consumption and wage in￿ ation are well replicated. Further-
more, the model is also able to reproduce the responses of the interest rate and money growth.
However, the model has some di¢ culty in reproducing the response of in￿ ation. We may suggest
that the reproduction of the magnitude of the response of in￿ ation may be tricky for the model
because of the length of the price puzzle: the response of in￿ ation is positive for ￿ve quarters.
22Recall that the theoretical model is suitable for each identi￿cation scheme. Particularly, we estimate the
model￿ s parameters using monetary policy rule (16) when we implement the MDE on the SVAR identi￿ed with
scheme B. In the same way, we use monetary policy rule (17) when we refer to scheme C for estimation.
23We implement a bootstrap technique in the spirit of the methodology proposed by Hall and Horowitz (1996).
Precisely, in schemes B and C, we generate 300 bootstrap replications of the SVAR model. For each replication,
we reestimate the parameters of the DSGE model and we compute the value of the minimum distance. Then, the
bootstraped distribution of this distance allows us to deduce a p-value for the overidenti￿cation test. With this
methodology, we can check whether these DSGE model pass the overidenti￿cation test implied by our choice of
moments. We obtain that the p-value of the overidenti￿cation test statistic is equal to 16:53% in scheme B and
48:41% in scheme C. This means that the two DSGE models are not rejected by the data.
19In ￿gure 3, the interest rate responds to current money growth disturbances and lagged output
and prices disturbances (scheme C). The goodness-of-￿t of the theoretical model seems to be
slightly improved, compared with the other scheme. Indeed, the model is able to perfectly re-
produce the responses of the interest rate and money growth. In addition, the reproduction of
the hump-shaped response of in￿ ation is better, although the price puzzle does not disappear
in the data. This means that the theoretical model is better able to generate in￿ ation persis-
tence which might be due to the rise in the persistence of the response of the interest rate in
comparison with scheme B.
Therefore, we show that a standard fully-￿ edged DSGE model is able to match the extra persis-
tence resulting from the simultaneity assumption between the interest rate and money growth, as
soon as it is built in order to closely corresponds to the SVAR model. Now, we wonder whether
this goodness-of-￿t of the model is obtained in return for unreasonable estimation values and
we also investigate how the monetary policy representation is a⁄ected in the DSGE model with
respect to the identi￿cation restrictions.
4.2 Estimation Results
The ￿rst two columns of table 3 report the estimated parameters for identi￿cation schemes B
and C. In a ￿rst step, we tried to estimate all the parameters in  . In each identi￿cation scheme,
some parameters were characterized by binding constraints. In a second step, we enforced these
equalities and estimated the remaining parameters.
4.2.1 Monetary Policy Shock and Deep Parameters
The magnitude of the monetary policy shock, ￿e, is signi￿cantly estimated at between 0:15 and
0:16. This suggests the impulsion in the economy is not strongly altered by the identi￿cation
20scheme.
We turn to investigate whether the estimates of taste and rigidity parameters vary with respect
to the identi￿cation scheme. The probability of no price adjustment, ￿p, is included in interval
[0:57;0:70]. This means that the average duration of price contract is around two and three
quarters. This value is consistent with the results reported by Bils and Klenow (2004). The
value of ￿p is not signi￿cant in scheme B but this might be due to the di¢ culty confronting
the model when it comes to replicating the response of in￿ ation. In addition, the improvement
of the model￿ s ￿t in scheme C implies a higher degree of price rigidities. The probability of no
wage adjustment, ￿w, is estimated between 0:77 and 0:86 which is higher than Christiano et al.
(2005) but consistent with Del Negro et al. (2007).
The preference parameters are given by the degree of habit consumption (b) and the curvature
of the utility function with respect to consumption (￿) which are closely linked together in the
estimation. These parameters are precisely estimated and they do not vary with respect to the
speci￿cation since b is estimated between 0:76 and 0:79 and ￿ is estimated between 0:13 and
0:15.
We now focus on the parameters related to the investment behavior, given by the investment
adjustment costs parameter (￿) and the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the rental
rate of capital (￿￿1
a ). The investment adjustment costs parameter, ￿, is between 6:82 and 8:16
which is slightly higher than in Smets and Wouters (2005, 2007). In addition, in scheme B, the
algorithm estimation drives ￿a to a very small value. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we set
￿a = 0:01. In scheme C, the estimated value of this parameter is 0:24, but it is not signi￿cant.
These small values of ￿a mean that capital utilization is highly sensitive to a variation of the
rental rate of capital, as in Christiano et al. (2005).
Consequently, it appears that the estimation of the deep parameters is quite robust to the
21identi￿cation schemes. This fact suggests that the overall structure of the economy is not
dependent on the assumed identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks.
4.2.2 Monetary Frictions
We now turn to discuss the estimated degree of transaction frictions and money demand function.
Firstly, we focus on the estimated real balance e⁄ects, ￿, in order to investigate whether balances
could have an impact on consumption behavior24. The estimates of ￿ imply that the real balance
e⁄ects are small (￿ = 0:07 and 0:03) but signi￿cant, whatever the identi￿cation restrictions. This
suggests that the money￿ s role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks is not neutral25.
Now, we seek to emphasize how identi￿cation schemes alter the estimation of the money demand
equation. It appears that the consumption elasticity of money demand (￿c) and the interest semi-
elasticity of money demand (￿R) are signi￿cantly estimated and they are sensitive to a change
of the identi￿cation scheme. Indeed, ￿R is close to one in scheme B, but it strongly increases
when we assume simultaneity between the interest rate and money growth (￿R = 3:10). This
result suggests that money demand is more sensitive to variation of the interest rate in scheme
C. This is not surprising if we look at the impact response of money growth to monetary policy
shocks (￿gure 1). Indeed, this contemporaneous response is higher in scheme C, implying a higher
interest semi-elasticity of money demand. This higher elasticity results in a larger value of ￿c
in scheme C (￿c = 3:49) than scheme B (￿c = 2:22). This e⁄ect is due to the link between these
elasticities26. The estimated values of ￿c are higher than usually assumed in the literature ￿
24Ireland (2004) points out that shifts in money demand have to be considered to measure the e⁄ect of variations
of money on output and in￿ ation. However, in this paper, we focus on the impact of money on consumption after
monetary policy shocks. In this case, we do not need to take explicitly exogenous shifts in money demand into
account since variations of money balances result from the monetary policy shock. Therefore, contrary to Ireland
(2004), ￿ is only a monetary policy transmission channel.
25Let us recall that ￿ = ￿￿. We estimate ￿ and ￿ and the standard error of ￿ is calculated using the numerical
Delta method.
26Let us recall that (1 ￿ ￿b)￿c = ￿R￿￿. Since b, ￿ and ￿ are not strongly modi￿ed between schemes B and C,
most of the increase of ￿R is o⁄set by an increase of ￿c.
22i.e. a unity income elasticity of money demand ￿and emphasizes the wealth e⁄ect on money
demand. Thus, assuming that the interest rate is simultaneously determined with money growth
implies a signi￿cant increase of the sensitivity of broad monetary aggregate to consumption and
the interest rate.
4.2.3 Monetary Policy Rule
The previous results can be confronted to the estimated monetary policy rule which is essential
for our discussion. The degree of smoothing of the interest rate is high in schemes B and C (￿i
= 0:86 and 0:95, respectively). This suggests that the behavior of the Federal Reserve is rather
gradualist over our sample. However, results concerning ap, ay and am con￿rm the intuition
that the propagation of the monetary policy shock varies with respect to the identi￿cation
assumption. Under the non-simultaneity assumption (scheme B), we ￿nd that the estimated
monetary policy rule is signi￿cantly active (ap = 1:49) which is consistent with the traditional
view. In addition, the role of current output in the monetary policy rule seems to be negligible
since the estimation algorithm drives ay to zero in this scheme.
In scheme C, we allow for simultaneity between the interest rate and money growth, setting the
interaction between these two monetary variables without priors, unlike the last scheme. In this
case, we obtain that the monetary authority does not respond to past in￿ ation (ap = 0), whereas
it signi￿cantly responds to current money growth disturbances (am = 1:19). In addition, the
sensitivity of the interest rate to output is equal to 0:48 and it is signi￿cant at 10%. Therefore,
assuming that the interest rate is simultaneously determined with money growth results in a
high and signi￿cant value of am. This con￿rms that the theoretical model is able to capture
the identi￿cation restrictions imposed in the SVAR model. Particularly, the assumption of
simultaneity between money growth and the interest rate favors a money growth rule rather
23than a Taylor rule27. This result runs counter the usual thought that interest rate decisions
are made only with respect to in￿ ation and output paths. However, Christiano et al. (2005)
estimate a DSGE model by MDE on a monetary policy shock which is identi￿ed with the
Cholesky decomposition and they show that the use of a money growth rule or a Taylor rule
provides the same estimation results. Therefore, in the same spirit, we show that the money
growth rule may be a valuable speci￿cation and we show that the identi￿cation restrictions are
not neutral in the interpretation of the monetary policy decisions.
4.3 Discussion
By considering a DSGE model which closely corresponds to a particular SVAR model, we showed
that the monetary policy representation in the estimated DSGE model is deeply changed by the
identi￿cation restrictions made in the SVAR model. Precisely, the simultaneity assumption be-
tween the interest rate and money growth implies a high and signi￿cant interest elasticity to
money supply. This result di⁄ers from the traditional view concerning the Taylor rule. However,
we also showed that a variation of the real balances has a signi￿cant small e⁄ect on consumption
path, whatever the identi￿cation scheme is. In view of these ￿ndings, we can infer that the ques-
tion of the money￿ s role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in a DSGE model is not
straightforward. Therefore, we seek to investigate the real balance e⁄ect￿ s contribution to these
results. Indeed, if we show that the absence of real balance e⁄ect does not change our estima-
tion results, we could conclude that money only matters in the transmission of monetary policy
shocks through the monetary policy rule and its does not have a causal role on consumption
and in￿ ation paths. Thus, in this section, we carry out a set of exercises in order to investigate
27Indeed, since the monetary rule includes the interest rate and money growth and excludes in￿ ation, we may
interpret this relationship as a money growth rule. Output is also included in this relationship implying that we
cannot interpret it as a money growth rule in the strict sense.
24to what extent our estimation results are a⁄ected by a change in the speci￿cation of money in
the theoretical model.
We start by investigating how the interest elasticity to money supply matters for the dynamics of
a standard DSGE model. Indeed, the signi￿cant value of am in scheme C implies that monetary
authorities may take a great interest in broad monetary aggregate, especially as ap is null. This
intuition is con￿rmed when we reestimate the theoretical model, in scheme C, subject to the
constraint am = 0. In this case, the algorithm estimation drives ap close to one and we encounter
the usual indeterminacy issue28. This result con￿rms that money is essential in the monetary
policy rule as soon as we leave the relationship between the interest rate and money growth free
during the identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks. Henceforth, the estimated monetary policy
rule runs counter to the Taylor rule. The primordial role of money in central bank￿ s decisions
is interpreted by Smets (2003) as the re￿ ection that money contains information about future
output and price and it can be viewed as a forward looking indicator. Although we are not able
to con￿rm this interpretation with our DSGE model, we may think that money can be viewed
as a useful indicator for monetary policy decisions in our DSGE model.
We now turn to focus on the role of money in the monetary policy transmission channels, through
the real balance e⁄ects. The estimated real balance e⁄ects in each scheme are signi￿cant but
they are also very small. This might suggest that the main role of money in the transmission
of monetary policy shocks is not given by its impact on consumption and in￿ ation paths. It is
usual in the literature to ￿nd that money has no role in the consumption behavior. Precisely,
Woodford (2003) already shows that the variables￿dynamics are not modi￿ed by the omission
of real balance e⁄ects in theoretical models. Some authors also emphasize the unimportant role
of money in the overall behavior of the economy (McCallum, 2001; Ireland, 2004; Dotsey and
28We do not report the details of the estimation because of the indeterminacy issue.
25Hornstein, 2003; Woodford, 2003; AndrØs et al., 2006)29. However, unlike these authors, we
focus on money￿ s role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
Therefore, we reestimate the model subject to ￿ = 030. Not surprisingly, in light of the previous
result, we were confronted with identi￿cation issues in scheme C, which result in the impossibility
to identify am when ￿ = 0. In other words, the relationship between money growth, in￿ ation and
consumption helps to identify a generalized Taylor￿ s rule in which the interest rate can respond
to broad monetary aggregate. Consequently, we reestimate our model subject to the constraints
am = ￿ = 0, in each scheme. Firstly, ￿gures (4) and (5) compare the SVAR-based and model-
based IRFs in schemes B and C, respectively, by assuming that money is supplied in the model
only in order to clear the monetary market. In each scheme, the model is clearly unable to
replicate the impulse response of money growth. This directly results from the constraint ￿ = 0.
Indeed, due to equation (10), the constraint ￿ = 0 means that the interest semi-elasticity of
money demand (￿R) is also constrained, which implies that the model is not able to ￿t the
response of money growth. In addition, in scheme C, the goodness-of-￿t of the model is worse
than in the unconstrained case, particularly concerning the impulse responses of in￿ ation, wage
in￿ ation and the interest rate which are not persistent enough. In scheme B, the deterioration
of the goodness-of-￿t is lower because this lack of persistence is less burdensome. These results
mean that the presence of real balance e⁄ect in scheme C helps to generate a strong persistence
of the interest rate. Indeed, due to the simultaneity between the interest rate and money growth,
money￿ s dynamics play an important role for those of the interest rate. Consequently, the model
does not generate enough persistence of the interest rate because of its bad performance when
it comes to replicating the response of money.
29However, some papers have also highlighted the important role of money in the variables￿dynamic (Favara
and Giordani, 2002; Nelson, 2002,2003).
30Precisely, we set ￿ = 0.
26The reestimated parameters are reported in the last two columns of table 3. The estimates of the
deep parameters are quite robust when we remove the real balance e⁄ects from the theoretical
model. However, the estimates of the monetary policy rule and their accuracy are strongly
changed by this speci￿cation. Indeed, in scheme B, ap tends to become very high (ap = 5:34)
and not signi￿cant. In scheme C, the value of ap is more consistent with the literature (ap = 1:17)
but it is also insigni￿cant. This result is not surprising since we showed in ￿gure (5) that the
model is unable to replicate the strong persistence of the interest rate. In addition, the sensitivity
of the interest rate to output tends to be null in the two schemes. Therefore, we con￿rm our
previous intuition that real balances can be viewed as a key mechanism in order to precisely
estimate the monetary policy rule.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we estimate two monetary SVAR models which
di⁄er in restrictions which are set to identify monetary policy shocks. A misspeci￿cation of an
empirical SVAR model might result from the extreme assumptions about the interest elasticities
of money supply and money demand, which are imposed when we use the Cholesky decom-
position (Leeper and Roush, 2003). We thus compare the impulse responses of key variables
according to the degree of simultaneity between the interest rate and money growth. Secondly,
we consider a theoretical monetary model in which the monetary policy representation is con-
sistent with the corresponding SVAR model. Then, we investigate whether this standard DSGE
model is able to replicate the higher persistence of in￿ ation and output given by the assump-
tion that the interest rate and money growth are simultaneously determined. In addition, we
highlight how the estimates of the DSGE model are changed with respect to the identi￿cation
scheme in the SVAR model.
27We obtain many results. Firstly, as in Leeper and Roush (2003), we show that the persistence
and the magnitude of the SVAR-based impulse responses are changed as soon as we assume
that the interest rate and money growth are simultaneously determined. Secondly, we show
that the standard CEE-based model is perfectly able to replicate the stronger persistence of
in￿ ation and output which results from the simultaneity assumption. In addition, this good
performance of the DSGE model does not result in a unreasonable degree of nominal rigidities
and the estimation of the taste parameters is robust to the assumed identi￿cation scheme.
Finally, the monetary policy representation in the estimated DSGE model is deeply changed by
the identi￿cation restrictions made in the SVAR model. Precisely, the simultaneity assumption
between the interest rate and money growth implies a high and signi￿cant interest elasticity
to money in the interest rate rule whereas the interest rate is inelastic to past in￿ ation. This
result di⁄ers from the traditional view concerning the Taylor rule which usually excludes money
from the monetary policy decisions. We also show that the real balance e⁄ects are essential to
precisely estimate the monetary policy rule, whatever the identi￿cation scheme. These results
suggest that we must be cautious about the identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks when we
are interested in the estimation by MDE of DSGE models which contains both money and the
interest rate. Indeed, in a standard CEE-based model, the estimates of the taste parameters
and the degrees of nominal rigidities are quite robust to the identi￿cation restrictions made in
the SVAR model. However, the estimated monetary policy representation is modi￿ed so as to
capture the extra persistence implied by the simultaneity assumption between the interest rate
and money growth.
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31Model Appendix
Production Side and Price Setting
In the ￿rst sector, the overall aggregate demand, dt, is produced in the competitive market and








d& = 1; (21)
where dt (&) denote the overall demand addressed to the producer of intermediate good &, and the
function G(￿) is increasing, strictly concave, and satis￿es the normalization G(1) = 1. From the
optimization program of the representative competitive ￿rm, we can deduce the overall demand



















Let ￿p (￿t) denote the elasticity of demand for a producer of intermediate good facing the relative
demand ￿t = dt (&)=dt. According to the implicit demand function (21), ￿p (￿t) obeys ￿p (￿t) =
￿G0 (￿t)=[￿tG00 (￿t)]. This equality makes clear that intermediate good ￿rms face a varying
elasticity of demand for their output, implying a time varying markup, which is denoted by
￿p (￿t), and obeys ￿p (￿t) ￿ ￿p(￿t)=[￿p(￿t) ￿ 1]. Afterwards, we denote ￿p as the steady state
elasticity of demand for a producer of intermediate good and ￿p as the steady state markup.
In the second sector, monopolistic ￿rms￿ & produce the intermediate goods & 2 [0;1]. Given











where ￿ is a ￿xed production cost which is computed so that aggregate pro￿ts are zero. This
speci￿cation, which includes material inputs in the production of intermediate goods, has been
proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). The real production cost ￿S(dt (&)) ￿of pro-
ducing unit good of & is
S(dt(&)) = wtnt(&) + rk
t kt(&) + xt(&): (24)
Notice that since capital and aggregate labor are supplied in economy-wide markets, each type
of input has the same price such that wt and rk
t do not depend on &. Due to its convenience,
this latter assumption is common in the literature (Yun, 1996; Erceg et al., 2000, for instance).
Minimization of the real production cost yields










where st is the total real marginal cost.
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in each period of time, a monopolistic ￿rm ￿ & can
reoptimize its price with probability 1￿￿p, irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised
its price. If the ￿rm cannot reoptimize its price, the latter is rescaled according to the simple
32revision rule
PT (￿ &) = ￿
p







j ; if T > t; ￿
p
t;T = 1; if T ￿ t: (26)
￿t = Pt=Pt￿1 represents the in￿ ation rate, ￿ is the steady state in￿ ation rate. Following Chris-
tiano et al. (2005) and Giannoni and Woodford (2004), we assume that ￿p = 1. Let P?
t (￿ &)
denote the price chosen in period t, and let d?
t;T(￿ &) denote the production of good & in period T
if ￿rm ￿ & last reoptimized its price in period t. In addition, we de￿ne p?
t(￿ &) = P?
t (￿ &)=Pt. Firm ￿ &
selects P?












































where ￿￿T=￿t is the stochastic discount factor, and Et￿1 f￿g is the expectation operator con-
ditional on information available until t ￿ 1. Standard manipulations yields equation (4). In
addition, using the fact that s = 1=￿p, the loglinearized version of the real marginal cost de￿ned
in equation (25) is given by equations (5) and (6).
Households￿Decisions
The economy is inhabited by di⁄erentiated households indexed on ￿ 2 [0;1], each of which is
endowed with a speci￿c labor type of labor. A typical household ￿ acts as a monopoly supplier of
type-￿ labor. Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume for convenience that a set of di⁄erentiated
labor inputs are aggregated into a single labor index ‘t by competitive ￿rms. They produce the












￿T￿t [U(cT ￿ bcT￿1;mT) ￿ V(‘T (￿))]; (28)
where mT = MT=PT and MT denotes nominal cash balances. In addition, E￿t is an expectation
operator conditioned on the particular information set available to the agent at the time he




+PTtaxT ￿ WT (￿)‘T (￿)+PTrk
TuTkT+BT￿1+MT￿1+PTdivT;
(29)








33where wT (￿) ￿ WT (￿)=PT is the real wage rate earned by type-￿ labor; bT ￿ BT=PT, where BT
denotes the nominal bonds acquired in period T and maturing in period T +1. In addition, divT
denotes pro￿ts redistributed by monopolistic ￿rms and taxT is a real lump-sum tax designed to
￿nance the subsidies granted to monopolistic ￿rms31. Finally, a(uT) denotes the real cost (in
unit of consumption good) of setting the utilization rate of uT and F(￿) measures the adjustment
costs related to investment. We assume that a(u) = 0, where u is the deterministic steady state
value of ut. Similarly, we assume that F(1) = F0(1) = 0, so that adjustment costs vanish along
a deterministic balanced growth path. Let us denote ￿t ￿ ￿tPt and pk;t ￿ ￿t=￿t, where ￿t and
￿t are Lagrange multipliers associated to budget constraint (29) and law of motion of capital
(30), respectively.
The loglinearized version of the FOCs with respect to Bt, ct, mt, kt+1, ut and it are given
by equations (7), (8), (9), (11), (12), (13). In equation (8), we have ￿￿1 = ￿Uccc=Uc. In
equation (9), parameters are given by ￿c = ￿Umcc=(Ummm) and ￿R = ￿(1 ￿ ￿b)Uc=(Ummm).
In equation (12) and (13), we have ￿a ￿ ua00(u)=a0(u). and { ￿ F00(1).
Households￿Wage Setting
It is assumed that at each point in time only a fraction 1 ￿ ￿w of the households can set a new
wage, which will remain ￿xed until the next time period the household is drawn to reset its
wage. The remaining households simply revise their wages according to the simply rule
WT (￿) = ￿w






j ; if T > t; ￿w
t;T = 1; if T ￿ t;
where we assume ￿w = 1. We assume that household ￿ reoptimizes its nominal wage rate in
period t. In the sequel, it will be convenient to de￿ne wage in￿ ation ￿w
t ￿ Wt=Wt￿1. Let W?
t (￿)
denote the wage rate chosen in date t, and ‘?
t;T (￿) denotes hours worked in period T if household
￿ last reoptimized its wage in period t. In period t, household ￿ chooses his wage rate W?
t (￿)






























Standard manipulations yield equation (15), where !w = ‘V‘‘=V‘.
Data Appendix
The SVAR model is estimated with quarterly data over the sample 1959Q2-2004Q4. All the
series are seasonally adjusted except for the interest rate and commodity prices. The series
are constructed as following. yt is real output, non farm business sector (Source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics). it is ￿xed private investment (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). It
31As in Christiano et al. (2005), we assume that the government manages lump-sum taxes and it pursues a
Ricardian ￿scal policy. This implies that ￿scal policy has no impact on the variables. Therefore, we do not specify
this latter.
34is divided by the implicit price de￿ ator of output. ct is personal consumption of non durable
goods and services (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). It is divided by the implicit price
de￿ ator of output. ￿w
t is growth rate of hourly compensation, non farm business sector (Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics). ￿t is growth rate of the implicit price de￿ ator of output, non farm
sector (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics). it is Federal funds rate, e⁄ective rate (Source:
Federal Reserve Board). ￿mt is growth money of M2 (Source: Federal Reserve Board). crbt
is Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) spot commodity price index, raw industrials (Source:
CRB). yt, it, ct and ￿mt are expressed in per-capita terms by dividing by the civilian non
institutional population, age 16 and over. In addition, log(yt), log(it), log(ct), log(crbt) are
linearly detrended.
35Table 1. Identi￿cation Schemes of Matrix A
Scheme B
"y "i "c "￿
w
"￿ "r "￿m "crb
￿y 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿i ￿ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿c ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0 0 0
￿￿
w
￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0 0
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0
￿R ￿ 0 0 0 ￿ 1 0 0
￿￿m 0 0 ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ 1 0
￿crb ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
Scheme C
"y "i "c "￿
w
"￿ "r "￿m "crb
￿y 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿i ￿ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿c ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0 0 0
￿￿
w
￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0 0
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0 0 0
￿R 0 0 0 0 0 1 ￿ 0
￿￿m 0 0 ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ 1 0
￿crb ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
Notes: For each scheme, we represent the identi￿cation restrictions of matrix A. ￿ denotes a freely
estimated parameter. In scheme B, the interest rate is predetermined for money growth. In scheme C,
the interest rate and money growth are simultaneously determined.











37Table 3. Results of MDE estimation (1959Q2-2004Q4)
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model










































































































Notes: Unconstrained model: Scheme B: the interest rate predetermined for money growth. Scheme C, the interest rate and money
growth simultaneously determined. Constrained model: Scheme B, ￿ = 0. Scheme C, ￿ = am = 0. The numbers in parentheses are the














































































































































































Figure 1: Comparison of the empirical impulse response functions (multiplied by 100) over the sample 1959Q2-
2004Q4.


































































































































































Figure 2: SVAR-based impulse responses (solid lines) and model-based impulse responses (lines with circle)
￿multiplied by 100 ￿to a monetary policy shock, in scheme B. Grey area corresponds to the 90% con￿dence
interval.






































































































































































Figure 3: SVAR-based impulse responses (solid lines) and model-based impulse responses (lines with circle)
￿multiplied by 100 ￿to a monetary policy shock, in scheme C. Grey area corresponds to the 90% con￿dence
interval.


































































































































































Figure 4: SVAR-based impulse responses (solid lines) and model-based impulse responses (lines with circle) ￿
multiplied by 100 ￿to a monetary policy shock, in scheme B, when we enforce ￿ = 0. Grey area corresponds to
the 90% con￿dence interval.






































































































































































Figure 5: SVAR-based impulse responses (solid lines) and model-based impulse responses (lines with circle) ￿
multiplied by 100 ￿to a monetary policy shock, in scheme C, when we enforce ￿ = am = 0. Grey area corresponds
to the 90% con￿dence interval.
41